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FOURTH AMENDMENT-
OVEREXTENDING THE AUTOMOBILE




United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
In United States v. Ross,l the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
search of a paper bag and leather pouch located inside an automobile
that police had probable cause to search. Thus, the Court overrruled its
1981 plurality decision, Robbins v. California.2 In Robbins, a badly frac-
tured Supreme Court had held that the "automobile exception ' 3 to the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment 4 did not allow the war-
rantless search of closed containers that are inside a car, even when the
automobile itself is undergoing a valid warrantless search. Writing for
the Ross majority, Justice Stevens expressly discarded the Robbins hold-
ing and instead held the automobile exception to support the warrant-
less search of a container found in a car as well as the car itself.
Unfortunately, the Court decided Ross improperly. The majority's
decision was not supported by exigent circumstances nor by any dimin-
ished privacy expectations on the part of the driver. The Court's ration-
ale for validating warrantless searches of containers in vehicles was to
provide police with a "bright line" rule and to increase the efficiency of
police investigations. Ross fails, however, to clarify the standards for po-
lice in conducting a warrantless search because it creates a distinction
between cases where police have probable cause to search a car and
those where they have probable cause to search a specific container in a
1 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
2 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality decision).
3 Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile without a warrant if
they have probable cause to believe that contraband is within. Se infra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
4 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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car. In addition, marginal gains in efficiency do not justify limiting
fourth amendment protections. Hence, Ross distorts the original justifi-
cation for the automobile exception and constricts the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment.
I. UNITED STATES V Ross
A. THE FACTS IN ROSS
Having probable cause to believe that an automobile contained il-
legal drugs,5 officers of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police
stopped the car and asked its driver, Albert Ross, to step out. As one
officer searched Ross's person, another noticed a bullet on the front seat
of the car. They then searched the inside of the car and found a pistol in
the glove compartment. At this point, Ross was arrested and
handcuffed. 6
One of the officers unlocked the car's trunk and discovered a zip-
pered red leather pouch and a closed brown paper bag.7 The policeman
opened the paper bag and found several smaller glassine bags holding a
white powder. He returned the paper bag to the trunk and an officer
drove Ross's car to police headquarters.
One of the same policemen then made a thorough search of the
vehicle, including a search of the paper bag and the leather pouch.,
Neither this search nor the previous opening of the paper bag was con-
ducte4 pursuant to g search warrant.
A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Ross for
possession of heroin, possession of herin with the intent to distribute,
carrying a pistol without a license, and possessing a firearm after having
been previously convicted of a felony.9 The trial court denied Ross's
motion to suppress the evidence taken from the pouch and bag, and a
jury found Ross guilty of possession of narcotics with intent to
distribute.,0
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
5 The officers did pot have a warrant to search the car or to arrest Ross. They were
acting on a Tip from a reliable narcotics informant that "Bandit" (a/k/a Albert Ross) was
selling drugs from his car on a Washington, D.C., street. After locating a parked automobile
that matched the informant's description, the officers continued to patrol the neighborhood,
waiting for the owner of the car to return to the vehicle. Soon the officers saw the car being
driven around a corner from where it had been parked and, after overtaking the vehicle, they
found that the driver matched the description provided by the informant. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
6 Ross did not have a license for the pistol. United States v. Ross, 650 F.2d 1159, 1162
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
7 The bag was "about the size of a lunch bag," "closed but unsealed." d.
8 The paper bag contained heroin and the pouch contained $3,200 in currency. Id.
9Id.
10 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).
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District of Columbia reversed Ross's conviction." The court relied
upon Arkansas v. Sanders12 to distinguish between the two containers.
The majority held that Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the pouch, but not in the paper bag, so that on retrial only the contents
of the bag could be admitted as evidence.' 3
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reconsidered the decision.' 4
After rejecting the original panel's "unworthy container" distinction
and observing that Arkansas v. Sanders '5 merely restated United States v.
Chadwick,'6 the court analyzed the situation in terms of those two
container cases.' 7 The court noted that the automobile exception was
based on the "inherent mobility" of the automobile' 8 and the burden on
the police in detaining a car while awaiting a warrant. Thus, it held
that the exception, "invoked to justify stopping the car and placing the
items found in it under police control cannot be stretched to encompass
the warrantless openings."' 9 The court of appeals upheld the reversal of
Ross's conviction and remanded the case. 20
't United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980).
12 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
13 The initial search of the car's passenger compartment and trunk was valid under Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). No.
79-1624, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980).
14 United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
15 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
16 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court also held that the rule in Sanders applied retroactively to
the date of the Chadwick decision and that Ross had standing to challenge the evidence. 655
F.2d at 1164-66.
17 In Chadwick, police had probable cause to believe that a footlocker placed in respon-
dent's car contained narcotics. After the footlocker was taken from a train and set in the
trunk of the car, and before the vehicle had moved, the officers arrested three people and
conducted a warrantless search of the footlocker. 433 U.S. at 3-4.
In Sanders, officers had probable cause to believe that a suitcase taken from a plane and
placed into the trunk of a taxi contained illegal drugs. When the taxi drove away, police
pursued and then stopped the taxi, told the driver to open the trunk, and conducted a war-
rantless search of the suitcase. 442 U.S. at 755. In both cases the Supreme Court held that
the searches violated the fourth amendment and that the evidence discovered could not be
admitted at trial. 433 U.S. at 15-16; 442 U.S. at 766.
18 655 F.2d at 1169.
19 Id. (footnotes omitted).
20 Id. at 117 1. Four of the eleven judges dissented. Judge Tamm argued that the search
of the paper bag was justified because Ross did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the bag, although he did concerning the pouch. Id. at 1171-72 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
Judge Robb agreed that precedent allowed the search of the bag alone, but found the distinc-
tion "impractical" and "amorphous." Id. at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey ar-
gued that the Sanders decision should not have been applied retroactively to the time of Ross's
arrest, and that the searches should have therefore been valid. Id. at 1181 (Wilkey, J., dissent-
ing). Judge MacKinnon concurred with the points made by Judges Tamm and Wilkey. Id.
at 1180 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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B. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court considered two questions in Ross: (1) Whether
the automobile exception, which permits the warrantless search of any
motor vehicle the police have probable cause to believe contains contra-
band, should apply to the search of any closed containers within an au-
tomobile; and (2) whether the Court should reconsider its decision in
Robbins v. California.21 The majority, per Justice Stevens, 22 held that the
automobile exception applied to any containers found within an auto-
mobile that is undergoing a valid warrantless search.23 The Court thus
overruled Robbins v. California24 and limited much of the language of Ar-
kansas v. Sanders. 25
Justice Stevens found the facts in Ross comparable to those in the
leading automobile exception cases, Carroll v. United States26 and Chambers
v. Maroney.27 In Carroll, prohibition agents conducted a warrantless
search of a car on a probable cause belief that it was transporting liquor.
In validating the search, the Carroll Court created a limited exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirement, observing that in the time
it would have taken the officers to obtain a warrant, the car would have
been out of the jurisdiction. 28 In Chambers, the Court extended the ex-
21 453 U.S. 420 (1981). The Robbins plurality stated that the automobile exception did not
justify the warrantless search of containers in a car that is being searched. A closed opaque
container "may not be opened without a warrant, even if it is found during the course of the
lawful search of an automobile." Id. at 428.
22 Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, with Justices Blackmun and Powell each filing short concurrences.
Justices White and Marshall each wrote a dissent and Justice Brennan joined in Justice Mar-
shall's opinion.
23 If police have legitimately stopped an automobile and have probable cause to believe
that contraband is hidden within it, they "may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as
thorough as a ipagistrate could authorize in a warrant 'particularly describing the place to be
searched.'" 102 S. Ct. at 2159 (footnote omitted).
24 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
25 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Some of the language in Sanders implied that police need a war-
rant in order to search any luggage found in an automobile. See in/ra notes 38-39 and 93 and
accompanying text.
26 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The Court reaffirmed the automobile exception in Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975) (probable cause search of an automobile once the car had been taken to
the police station); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (warrantless search of an
automobile after suspect admitted to having illegal liquor in the vehicle); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (search of an automobile on the probable cause belief that illegal
liquor was contained therein); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (warrantless
search of an automobile upon probable cause that it was transporting illegal liquor).
28 267 U.S. at 153. Chief Justice Taft noted the:
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a
ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
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ception to automobiles that had been seized and taken to the police sta-
tion, reasoning that if an immediate search of the car is justified, a later
search at the station would be no greater infringement on the owner's
fourth amendment rights. 29 As Justice Stevens interpreted these cases,
so long as an officer has probable cause 30 to believe that a vehicle con-
tains contraband, the vehicle may be searched immediately or back at
the station without the officer ever having to obtain a warrant. 31
Justice Stevens distinguished United Sta/es v. Chadwick3 2 and Arkansas
v. Sanders33 as being "container cases" while Ross was an "automobile
case.'' 34 According to Justice Stevens, in both Chadwick and Sanders, the
officers had probable cause to believe that the specific containers held
the contraband and their subsequent connection with automobiles was
"coincidental. ' 35 In neither case did an officer have probable cause to
justify the warrantless search of the entire vehicle; the probable cause
applied only to the luggage. 36
Justice Stevens also read Sanders as more than a mere reiteration of
the Chadwick holding.37 Some of the language in Sanders can be read to
imply that all opaque closed containers in automobiles must be searched
pursuant to a warrant.38 Justice Stevens believed that Sanders exceeded
Chadwick in "broadly suggest[ing] that a warrantless search of a
container found in an automobile could never be sustained as a part of a
warrantless search of the automobile itself."'39 While he had joined in
the Chadwick majority, in Sanders Justice Stevens joined Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence which complained that the majority "seems to
treat this case as if it involved the 'automobile' exception to the warrant
Id.
29 For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing
and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause
to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
339 U.S. at 527.
30 "[T]he probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could justify
the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the
police officers." 102 S. Ct. at 2164.
31 Id. The Chambers Court justified the later search of the car at the station on the basis of
practicality and officer safety. Justice Stevens, in Ross, also claimed that "[t]hese decisions are
based on the practicalities of the situations presented .... .. 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
32 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
33 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
34 102 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
35 Id. (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, J., concurring)).
36 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
37 The circuit court for the District of Columbia had stated that Sanders was only a reitera-
tion of Chadwick. 655 F.2d at 1162.
38 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
39 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
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requirement. It is not such a case."40 In Justice Stevens's Ross opinion,
the reasoning in Chadwick and Sanders was not applicable to Ross's situa-
tion, where police did have probable cause to search the entire
automobile.
The Court in Robbins v. Cafbmia,4 ' extending the language of Sand-
ers,42 required a warrant for the search of any containers found during
the probable cause search of a car, in the absence of exigent circum-
stances. In Ross, however, Justice Stevens pointed out that since the par-
ties in Robbins did not address the issue of extending the automobile
exception to containers in cars,43 the Robbins case was decided-improp-
erly-on the basis of Chadwick and Sanders.44
In analyzing the precedents, Justice Stevens noted that prior to the
Chadwick and Sanders decisions, searches of containers found during the
course of a valid warrantless automobile search were permissible.4 5 Jus-
tice Stevens reasoned that a contrary rule-requiring a warrant to
search containers in automobiles that police have probable cause to be-
lieve contain contraband-would nullify the practical consequences of
the prior decisions. 46
Justice Stevens then compared the search of an automobile to the
40 442 U.S. at 766 (Burger, J., concurring). As Justice Stevens wrote in Ross, "The [Sand-
ers] Court did not suggest that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search the entire
vehicle." 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
4' 453 U.S. 420 (1981). In Robbins, officers found bundles of marijuana inside of two green
plastic bags during the search of an automobile upon probable cause. The plurality, Justices
Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and White, held that the police should have obtained a warrant
before opening the bags. Id. at 428.
42 5"ee supra note 24.
43 In his dissent to Robbins, Justice Stevens argued for the same position later adopted by
the majority in Ross: "the 'automobile exception' to the warrant requirement therefore pro-
vided each officer with the authority to make a thorough search of the vehicle-including the
glove compartment, the trunk, and any containers in the vehicle that might reasonably con-
tain contraband." 452 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 102 S. Ct. at 2168.
45 Id. at 2169-70 (footnote omitted). In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),
agents tore open the rear seat of an automobile to find contraband. In Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), illegal whiskey was found in a search of burlap bags inside of a
car. The officers in Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938), opened paper packages in a
car trunk and found illegal liquor. In Chambers, weapons and stolen property were found in a
secret compartment under the dashboard of a car. In all of these cases, the Court upheld the
validity of the warrantless searches.
Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court in earlier cases had never considered any
arguments calling for warrants in the searches of containers in legitimately stopped vehicles.
102 S. Ct. at 2169-70.
46 "It would be illogical to assume that the outcome of Chambers--or the outcome of Car-
roll itself-would have been different if the police had found the secreted contraband en-




search of a house.47 A warrant to search a house is not limited by any
separate acts of opening or entry that the searching officer must per-
form. Claiming that a search under the automobile exception has the
same scope as one conducted pursuant to a warrant, Justice Stevens de-
clared that separate acts of entry or opening (as in opening a glove com-
partment or suitcase) should not in either case be a bar to the efficient
completion of the search.48  The only difference between the two
searches is that under the automobile exception, "[o]nly the prior ap-
proval of a magistrate is waived .. . .49
Thus, the Ross majority overruled Robbins v. California and the
"broad" language of Arkansas v. Sanders.50 "If probable cause justified
the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justified the search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search."51
Justices Blackmun and Powell, although having some theoretical
differences with the majority opinion, concurred.52 Both recognized the
importance of establishing clear guidelines for the police and lower
courts to follow, as well as the need to clear up the confusion in the area
of warrantless searches. 53
47 Id. at 2170.
48 Id. at 2170-71.
49 Id. at 2172. Since the officer conducting the warrantless search is not protected by a
magistrate's approval, Justice Stevens suggested that the threat of a law suit should deter the
police from abusing their power. Id. at 2172 n.32.
50 Ross overrules "the portion of the opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality
in Robbins relied." Id. at 2172. See infra note 93.
51 Id.
52 Justice Blackmun agreed that the automobile exception should apply to the search of
containers within automobiles. As he declared in his Sanders dissent, "[I]t would be better to
adopt a clear-cut rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize and search
any personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched with-
out a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 772
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He departed from the Ross majority in his disagreement with the
results in Chadwick and Sanders. While he believed that the Chadwick footlocker search should
have been upheld as a search incident to arrest, 433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), the
Sanders search should have been allowed under the automobile exception, 442 U.S. at 796
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Blackmun, the Court should clarify the confusing
distinction between cases where police have probable cause to search a container that is
placed into a car, and those where police have probable cause to search a car in general. 442
U.S. at 770-71 n.3. He concurred in Ross "[in order to have an authoritative ruling" that
established a bright-line rule for police to follow. 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
While Justice Powell prefers a case-by-case method of review for searches over Stevens's
bright-line rule in Ross, he concurred, as did Justice Blackmun, because the Ross decision
provides specific guidance for police in conducting automobile searches. 102 S. Ct. at 2173
(Powell, J., concurring). Powell tempered his concurrence by stating "that in many situations
one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a decisive factor in a search case." Id. He
had emphasized this point in his majority opinion in Sanders. 442 U.S. at 764-65.
53 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Blackmun, J., concuring); id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, 54 pointed
out four significant flaws in the majority opinion. According to Justice
Marshall, the most egregious error in Ross was that "[t]he Court simply
ignores the critical function that a magistrate serves."'55 A magistrate
serves as a check on the power of individual police officers, prevents the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search from becoming biased
through hindsight, and assures the public of the orderly process of the
law.56
Justice Marshall also contended that the majority decision was not
based upon either of what he saw as the traditional justifications for the
automobile exception: the exigency presented by the automobile's mo-
bility5 7 and the diminished expectation of privacy in a car.58  The
seizure of containers does not present police with the practical problems
that are involved in the impounding of an automobile.59 Moreover, a
container does not suddenly shed its ability to keep one's possessions pri-
vate once it is placed in a car.60
According to Justice Marshall, the Ross majority also distorted "the
letter and the spirit of [the] automobile search cases."'61 For example,
the basis of Carroll was the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in a
specific situation. As Chief Justice Taft wrote for the Carroll Court, "[i]n
cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must
be used .... -62 Justice Marshall took issue with the majority's sugges-
tion that since no arguments for the need of a warrant in the search of
containers in an automobile were made in 1925, such arguments would
be ineffective now. 63 The dissent emphasized the difference in terms of
mobility between a glove compartment or a trunk-which, as parts of
54 Justice White agreed with much of this dissent and stated that he would not overrule
Robbins v. California. 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (White, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "'This Court has long insisted that the inference
of probable cause be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" Id. (citing
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972)).
56 Id. at 2174-75. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
57 "IT]he inherent mobility of the vehicle often creates situations in which the police's
only alternative to an immediate search may be to release the automobile from their posses-
sion." Id. at 2175 (footnote omitted).
58 "By focusing on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court [until the
present case] has refused to require a warrant in situations where the process of obtaining
such a warrant would be more intrusive than the actual search itself." Id. at 2176.
59 Id.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 2178.
62 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 156, cited at 102 S. Ct. at 2178.
63 "I would hesitate to rely upon the 'professional understanding' of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or of Plessy v. Ferguson. . .in the early part of this Century as justification for




the car, share the same exigehcy considerations as the car itself-and
luggage or containers that may be readily removed from the car. 64
Finally, Justice Marshall found the majority opinion impossible to
reconcile with the results of Chadwick and Sanders. Under Chadwick and
Sanders, containers that police have probable cause to believe conceal
contraband cannot be searched without a warrant, in the absence of
consent, a custodial arrest, or exigent circumstances. 65 Under Ross, how-
ever, containers that are in automobiles subject to a warrantless search
upon probable cause may be opened without a warrant.66 Justice Mar-
shall stated that such a distinction "hardly indicates that the majority's
approach has brought clarification to this area of the law." 67
Justice Marshall posited that the majority's true purpose was to ad-
vance efficiency in police work.68 After Ross, police may follow through
on their probable cause beliefs without being checked by a magistrate or
hindered by a locked suitcase.69 The dissent rejected efficiency as a base
for constitutional law70 and warned that the privacy rights of people
traveling in cars would be severely limited by this decision. 71
II. ANALYSIS
A diminution of constitutional protections in favor of broadening
the scope of permissible police activities requires strong justification.
The majority's equation of containers with the vehicles in which they
may lie misapplies the precedents and the traditional justifications be-
hind the once narrow automobile exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirements. 72 In addition, the new rule does not succeed in
64 Id. at 2179.
65 See, e.g., Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766 ("[I]nsofar as the police are entitled to search ...
luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified under some exception to the war-
rant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway.").
66 "This rule plainly has peculiar and unworkable consequences: the Government 'must
show that the investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had sufficient
knowledge to establish probable cause but insufficient to know exactly where the contraband
was located.' " 102 S. Ct. at 2180 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ross,
655 F.2d 1159, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)).
67 Id. at 2181.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 2181-82.
70 "I had thought it well established that 'the mere fact that law enforcement may be
made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.'" 102 S.
Ct. at 2181 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)) (footnote omitted).
71 Id.
72 The traditional interpretation of the fourth amendment is that searches and seizures
are unconstitutional only if they are unreasonable. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN L. REv. 349, 358 (1974). In fourth amendment cases, "what the Court is
doing, in large part, is making a judgment as to the scope of the word 'unreasonable' as it
applied to searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment." E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 39 (1975). In 1950, the Supreme Court
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alleviating the confusion present in the area of warrantless container
searches. In Ross, the Court has thus improperly relaxed the constitu-
tional restrictions on warrantless searches.
A. THE TRADITIONAL REASONING
I. Exigent Circumstances and the Mobility of the Vehicle
The Supreme Court created the automobile exception in the 1925
landmark case, Carroll v. United States.73 In Carroll, the Court held that it
would not have been "reasonably practicable" for the police to have
obtained a magistrate's evaluation of whether the officers had probable
cause to believe that an automobile contained contraband. 74 The Court
upheld their immediate search of the car as necessary since "the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. '75 Under Carroll, an officer must have prob-
able cause to believe that a motor vehicle is carrying contraband and
must also be presented with exigent circumstances before the exception
to the warrant applies. 76
For many years, the Carroll doctrine remained a very narrow excep-
tion, not often used to justify searches. 77 In 1970, however, the Court
stated that "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
The Court has retreated from its position in Rabinowitz in recent years. "This view, how-
ever, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment is not dead language." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 315 (1972). The more recent interpretation is that the reasonableness clause is defined in
terms of the warrant clause. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
Amsterdam puts the exceptions into three categories: "consent searches, a very limited
class of routine searches [for example, border searches or the search of impounded vehicles],
and certain searches conducted under circumstances of haste that render the obtaining of a
search warrant impracticable." Amsterdam, supra note 72, at 358. The Ross decision seems to
add an exception based upon probable cause alone to this list, 102 S. Ct., at 2181-82 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting), thus downgrading the warrant clause of the fourth amendment to the
"dead language" position it occuped after Rabinowitz.
73 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
74 Id. at 156.
75 Id. at 153.
76 See J. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 268 (1982); Katz, Automobile Searches and Dim-
ishedExpectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 557, 563-64 (1982); Note, Fourth
Amendment-Of Cars, Containers, and Confusion, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1192
(1981); Note, Robbins and Belton Conk'cting Signas from the Supreme Court on Search and Seizure of
Containers in Automobiles, 54 Miss L.J. 227, 233 (1982).
77 LaFave asserts that the Carroll doctrine did not become important until the Court, in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S 752 (1969), limited the scope of a search incident to arrest to
the area within the immediate contri- of the arrestee. Thus restricted, the police reverted to
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broadened the scope of the exception in Chambers v. Maroney .78 The
Court in Chambers, while seeming to adhere to the exigency require-
ment, 79 permitted a warrantless search in a situation where there was no
threat that the car would be driven away or that the officers would be
harmed. Under Chambers, if the police have the right to conduct an im-
mediate search of a car-through the coexistence of probable cause and
exigent circumstances-that right to search "vests" in the police 0 and
validates a later search of the automobile at the station house.8' Thus,
the validity of the search in Chambers did not rest upon the exigency
justification. Furthermore, because the Court did not want to permit
the warrantless seizure of a car while prohibiting a warrantless search, it
held a search of the car to be constitutionally equivalent with the car's
seizure. 2
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chambers, wrote "[w]here nothing in
the situation makes impracticable the obtaining of a warrant, I cannot
join the Court in shunting aside that vital Fourth Amendment safe-
guard."8' 3 Commmentators have agreed with Justice Harlan that the
Supreme Court in Chambers incorrectly strayed from the exigency re-
quirement for the automobile exception.8 4
The Court's later decisions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire"5 and Card-
well v. Lewis86 reflect the confusion generated by the Chambers decision.
In holding that the police had improperly searched an impounded car,
the Coolidge plurality seemed to reaffirm the importance of exigency:
"Here there was probable cause, but no exigent circumstances justified
the police in proceeding without a warrant. '8 7 In Cardwell v. Lewis,
the automobile exception to justify the warrantless search of an entire car. 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 511-12 (1978).
78 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
79 "Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause
serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Id. at 51.
80 C. MOYLAN, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE 88 (1976).
81 399 U.S. at 52.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 64 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84 LaFave stated that "Chambers cannot be convincingly rationalized in terms of the oft-
stated principle that a search warrant is required except in exigent circumstances .... " 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 514 (1978). Lewis Katz, agreeing with LaFave, com-
plained: "The Chambers Court . . . extended the warrant requirement waiver to a situation
where it was demonstratably unnecessary." Katz, supra note 76, at 566. Joseph Grano also
criticized the Chambers decision: "[U]nder a true exigent circumstances rationale, no persua-
sive argument can be made for the retention of Chambers . . . . the Court in Chambers de-
parted from the only rationale that gives appropriate respect to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement." Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amenmdment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM.
GRIM. L. REV. 603, 645-46 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
85 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
86 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
87 403 U.S. at 464.
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however, the Court upheld the warrantless search of the exterior of a
parked car that had been towed to police headquarters.88 The basis of
the Cardwell decision was that the car owner had a diminished privacy
expectation in his car.8 9
In United States v. Chadwick,90 the Court applied the concept of exi-
gency to the warrantless search of containers. In defining when contain-
ers could be searched without a warrant, Chief Justice Burger declared,
"[W]hen no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate
search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the prop-
erty to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police au-
thority." 9' Luggage in an automobile does not share the same degree of
mobility as the car does because the police can always remove contain-
ers.92 Two years later in Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court reached a similar
conclusion: "Once the police have seized a suitcase. . . the extent of its
mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken.
Accordingly. . . there is no greater need for warrantless searches of lug-
gage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other
places."93
In 1981, the Court in Robbins v. California94 relied upon the Chadwick
and Sanders container cases to invalidate the warrantless search of con-
tainers in a car trunk.95 As Justice Stewart wrote for the plurality:
"Those cases made clear, if it was not clear before, that a closed piece of
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to
the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else."'96
Following the Robbins decision, the en banc court of appeals in Ross in-
validated the search of the paper bag and the leather pouch due to the
88 417 U.S. at 592.
89 Id. at 591-92. "Cardwell makes no sense at all. It states things that were totally unneces-
sary to the decision, and it was seemingly decided contrary to Coolidge and Carroll. The slight-
est change in the facts (and, alas, even the Court) can alter the result and the course of the
law." J. HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 265 (1982) (footnote omitted).
90 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See supra note 17.
91 Id. at 15.
92 Id. at 13.
93 442 U.S. at 763-64 (footnotes omitted). This is some of the "broad language" that the
Ross decision overruled. Ross also overruled such phrases as: "[There is] no justification for
the extention of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of one's personal luggage
merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police." Id. at 765
(footnote omitted). See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
94 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality decision).
95 The police stopped Robbins for driving erratically. When officers approached the
driver's window, they smelled marijuana smoke coming from the car. A subsequent search of
the car revealed two large green plastic bags. After opening them without a warrant, the
officers discovered that they contained large quantities of marijuana. Id. at 422.
96 Id. at 425. Since California could not show how the facts fit into any of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement, a search of the containers in the car's luggage compartment was
illegal. Id. at 428-29.
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lack of exigent circumstances. 9 7
The Supreme Court in Ross refused to follow the logic of Chadwick
and Sanders and overruled Robbins. In Ross, Justice Stevens dealt with
the exigency justification in terms of the Chambers decision. He reasoned
that if the circumstances allowed a seizure of the containers, a search of
them would also be permissible.98 However, Justice Stevens failed to
give weight to the difference between an automobile and a container.
Even if one could accept the Chambers reasoning equating the search of a
car with its seizure, such logic could not rationally apply to containers.
The officers in Ross were never presented with exigent circumstances
that could justify the search of the containers. Only a seizure of the
containers was justified. The search of the car in Chambers was justified
on the basis of convenience to both the police and the suspect. 99 In
contrast, depriving a motorist of a paper bag or a suitcase for the time
necessary for the police to obtain a warrant is not nearly as great an
inconvenience for either party.
In effect, the Ross Court circumvented the exigency requirement
and upheld the search simply because the practice of conducting
searches without having to obtain warrants is more practical for the po-
lice. '00 Since exigent circumstances were not present, the officers in Ross
should have only seized the containers that they had probable cause to
believe held contraband. They then could have applied for a warrant,
and a magistrate would have evaluated the grounds for their opinion.
2. A Diminished Expectation of Prva
The diminished expectation of privacy claimed to be inherent in
automobiles' 0 t was not one of the original justifications for the automo-
bile exception. The Court in Carroll v. United States did not mention such
a privacy expectation as the basis for distinguishing automobiles from
immobile objects. In fact, many critics believe that later Supreme Court
decisions have misapplied this concept to circumvent the exigency
97 655 F.2d at 1168 (footnote omitted). "[B]oth containers were securely removed from
Ross's reach at the time of the seizure; the police entertained no belief that the containers or
their contents endangered their personal safety; with the pouch and bag in police posession
there was no risk that the evidence would be lost or destroyed before a warrant could be
obtained." Id. (citation omitted).
98 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
99 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
100 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. Some jurisdictions permit magistrates to authorize search war-
rants by telephone or radio. Justice Stevens's practicality argument for bypassing the war-
rant requirement is significantly weakened if a warrant can be obtained over the phone. See
infra note 150.




Even if the concept properly validates warrantless searches of
automobiles, there is, however, no logical rationale for allowing war-
rantless searches of containers in automobiles based on a diminished pri-
vacy expectation in such containers.
In Katz v. United States , 10 3 the Supreme Court for the first time rec-
ognized a protected "expectation of privacy" right under the fourth
amendment. The Court held that the fourth amendment protects
"what [one] seeks to preserve as private."' 1 4 During the same term, in
Terry v. Ohio,105 the Court stated that "wherever an individual may har-
bor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy' . . . he is entitled to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 0 6
The Court in Chambers v. Maroney equated the search of an automo-
bile to its seizure in terms of intrusiveness. 107 It held that the search was
no greater violation of the owner's privacy than was a seizure of the
car.10 Three years later, Justice Powell, in his concurrence to Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States,10 9 stated that "[t]he search of an automobile is
far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than
the search of one's person or of a building." 110 A plurality of the Court
in Cardwell v. Lewis " ' applied the expectation of privacy concept to jus-
tify the warrantless search of a parked car that had been impounded.
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects . . . . It travels public thoroughfares
where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view."" 2 In Cham-
bers and Cardwell, the Court utilized the rationale that the search of an
automobile violates no significant privacy expectation to validate
searches in nonexigent circumstances. 1 3
102 See Grano, supra note 84, at 638; Katz, supra note 76, at 570; Note, Fourth Amendment-Of
Cars, Containers, and Confusion, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1172, 1190 (1981).
103 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
104 Id. at 351.
105 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
106 Id. at 9.
107 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
108 But see United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). In Van Leeuwen, decided
the same year as Chambers, the Court held that a temporary detention (seizure) of mail without
a warrant is less an intrusion than the warrantless search of it would have been. The latter
would have been unconstitutional. Id. at 252.
109 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
110 Id.
11 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality decision).
112 Id. at 590. The plurality went so far as to state that "insofar as Fourth Amendment
protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our
inquiry." Id. at 591.
113 See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
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The majority in United States v. Chadwick"I4 noted the difference be-
tween the expectations of privacy in automobiles and privacy expecta-
tions in containers, and invalidated the warrantless search of a
footlocker: "Luggage contents are not open to public view . . . nor is
luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continu-
ing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transporta-
tion, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects."' "5
In Arkansas v. Sanders," 6 the Court applied Chadwick's expectation of
privacy distinction between cars and containers to invalidate the war-
rantless search of a suitcase. According to Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, "[A] suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the high-
way is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than
is associated with luggage taken from other locations."'"1 7 In a footnote,
however, Justice Powell commented that not all containers found in a
car during the course of a search are fully protected by the fourth
amendment. Justice Powell noted that some containers, as a result of
their shape or the material of which they are made, "cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance."" 8 This ambiguous dicta resulted in
many conflicting lower court opinions as to what containers could be
searched without a warrant in any given situation.t19
The Court, in Robbins v. Caiormia,'2 0 tried to eliminate the chaos
resulting from Powell's comment. The Robbins plurality interpreted his
'14 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
'15 Id. at 13.
116 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
'17 Id. at 764.
118 Id. at 764 n.13. As examples of such containers, Powell mentioned a kit of burglar tools
and a gun case. Id.
119 Many courts interpreted Powell's footnote 13 as recognizing an expectation of privacy
for all containers whose contents could not readily be determined from the outside. See, e.g.,
United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (invalidating the war-
rantless search of a suitcase in an automobile); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir.
1979), aft'd, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (invalidating the warrantless search of sealed card-
board boxes in a vehicle); United States v. Bella, 605 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(warrantless search of guitar case invalidated); People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d
514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979) (invalidating warrantless search of
tote bag).
Other courts interpreted footnote 13 as making a "worthy container" distinction, al-
lowing a paper bag to be searched without a warrant while a briefcase would be protected.
See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 636 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1981) (upheld warrantless search of
paper bag in car); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980) (validated warrant-
less search of plastic bags); United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1980) (upheld wacrantless search of envelope); United States v. Milhollan, 599
F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909 (1979) (validated warrantless search of a closed
satchel in automobile).
120 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
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footnote to mean: "[U]nless the container is such that its contents may
be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment."121 The plurality required a warrant for the
search of all closed opaque containers.1 22 Yet Justice Powell did not join
the Robbins plurality because he believed that the requirement for a war-
rant for the search of all closed containers in automobiles was mechani-
cal and ignored the differing privacy interests emphasized in his Sanders
footnote. ' 23
The Ross Court concluded that the privacy expectation that an au-
tomobile occupant has toward containers found within his or her car is
outweighed by the police's interest in conducting investigations effi-
ciently, without having to deal with the "impracticality" of obtaining
search warrants. 24 Justice Stevens, for the majority, relied upon Cham-
bers 129 for his practicality argument: an immediate search is more effi-
cient than the impounding or securing of an item until a warrant can be
obtained, and such a search is no more intrusive on private rights.' 26 All
that is needed is probable cause, which is no longer evaluated before the
121 Id. at 427.
122 Id. at 428.
123 Id. at 433 (Powell, J., concurring).
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), decided the same day at Robbins, and with
facts strikingly similar to those in Robbins, the Court permitted a warrantless search of an
automobile's passenger compartment and any containers therein when that search is incident
to a custodial arrest. Id. at 460. The Court's rationale was that the arrest preempts any
privacy expectation that the arrestee may have in his car or the containers within the passen-
ger compartment. Id. at 461. The Be/ton decision established a bright-line rule for police to
follow in searches incident to arrest. Similarly, Justice Stevens set out a bright-line test in
Ross for probable cause searches. Although Stevens never mentioned Be/ton, his opinion in
Ross appears to reflect that decision. Justice Powell recognized that the Ross decision "is
consistent with the similar step taken last Term in Be/ton v. New York .... " 102 S. Ct. at
2173. (Powell, J., concuring).
The Court's decisions distinguish between the two types of searches represented in Ross
and Be/ton. In a search upon probable cause under the automobile exception, officers may
open containers found anywhere within the automobile. In a search incident to a legal arrest,
police may search without a warrant only those containers found within the passenger com-
partment of a car. Logic does not support this distinction between the scope of a search
incident to arrest and the scope of a probable cause search. If this trend toward bright-line
rules continues, it is likely that the Court will amend the Be/ton rule to conform with the rule
in Ross.
124 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
125 399 S. Ct. at 42.
[W]hich is the 'greater' and which is the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question
and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes,
we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immedi-
ate search without a warrant.
Id. at 51-52.
t26 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
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search but in hindsight.1 27
Justice Stevens ignored the factual differences between Ross and
Chambers. Chambers concerned the search of an automobile and the im-
practicalities resulting from seizing a car while obtaining a search war-
rant.128 The Chambers decision rested upon the suspect's diminished
privacy expectations in his or her car and the transportation function of
the automobile.1 29 Containers are different from automobiles in terms
of both mobility and the amount of privacy expected.' 30 Even if a war-
rantless automobile search can be based upon the owner's imputedly
diminished privacy expectation in the car, such a diminished expecta-
tion cannot rationally extend to containers that happen to be inside the
car at the time it is searched. A search of the containers is a greater
intrusion than their seizure. t3' The Chambers logic, then, is not applica-
ble to this situation. Hence, the Ross majority failed to honor the pri-
vacy expectation that the Court itself had read into the fourth
amendment in Katz and Chadwick.
B. SIGNIFICATIONS
L Continuing Confusion
Justice Stevens, as well as the other members of the Ross Court,
recognized the importance of clarifying the scope of warrantless
searches.' 32 Yet the result of this bright-line ruling is not the clarifica-
tion that is so badly needed, but a shift of the confusion into the realm of
probable cause.
The Court in Ross eliminated a major ambiguity that was left over
from the Robbzis decision. Now there are no longer any distinctions
based upon the expectation of privacy in different types of containers.
The Ross decision provided the police with some guidelines as to what
behavior is permissible in a car search so that officers no longer have to
make metaphysical distinctions as to the nature of different containers
in a car. In both probable cause searches of automobiles' 33 and searches
127 See id. at 2176-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128 Seizing an automobile involves towing it or posting guard at the car. Seizing a paper
bag or a footlocker merely requires taking the container to the station in a police car.
129 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14 n.8 (It was the "greatly reduced expectation of privacy in the
automobile, coupled with the transportation function of the vehicle" that made the Chambers
Court reluctant to decide whether the immediate search or the immobilization of an automo-
bile is the more serious of the two infringements. "This is clearly not the case with locked
luggage.").
130 Id.
131 See supra note 108.
132 102 S. Ct. at 2161. See also supra note 52.
133 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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incident to the arrest of the driver or of a passenger, 134 an officer may
open any container found within the car that could possibly hold the
object of the search. 13 5
A new ambiguity, however, has replaced the one that has been clar-
ified. The validity of a warrantless search of a container in a car now
turns on whether an officer's probable cause first concerns the
container13 6 or the car.13 7 Since the Ross Court did not overrule Chad-
wick or the ruling of Sanders, an officer is still required to obtain a war-
rant if he or she has probable cause to search a container placed in an
automobile after probable cause has attached to the container. Under
Ross, though, the officer need not obtain a search warrant if he or she
has probable cause to believe that contraband is hidden inside a car,
which happens to harbor a container. Thus, one whose container is not
in a car when probable cause to search that container arises has more
constitutional protection than one whose identical container is inside an
automobile for which there is probable cause to search.
Ross will give courts as many interpretational problems as did Jus-
tice Powell's footnote in Sanders.138 Already, a lower court interpreting
Ross'39 has observed:
It is obvious from the Court's discussion and treatment of the issues that
some container locations are less equal than others, for better or worse and
however illogical some of the distinctions in the application may appear.
Rules that apply to containers in automobiles do not necessarily apply
134 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See supra note 123.
135 The scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to the passenger compartment of the
car. Id. at 460. See supra note 123.
136 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
137 United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2157 (1982). See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
138 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
139 United States v. White, No. 80-CR-159, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 9, 1982). The opinion
was written by District Judge Shadur. Ross has affected the results of other recent search and
seizure cases: United States v. Riviera, 684 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982) (warrantless search of
vehicles and black polyethylene garbage bags found therein was valid under Ross); United
States v. Kelly, 683 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1982) (warrantless search of Winnebago and green
plastic bags therein upheld); United States v. Floyd, 681 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1982) (Ross used
to uphold warrantless search of containers in car trunk because police had probable cause to
believe that the car was transporting illegal drugs); United States v. Sanchez, No. 81-1444,
slip op. (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1982) (Ross used to validate the warrantless search of a vehicle's
false auxiliary gas tank); State v. Jaso, - Kan. -, 648 P.2d I (Kan. 1982) (Ross used to
validate the warrantless search of a suitcase in a car that police had probable cause to believe
harbored illegal drugs. "[Tjhe prohibition against a warrantless search of a specific container
thought to contain the sought after contraband is still to be distinguished from the authorized
search of a vehicle and its contents when the officers only have probable cause to believe that
contraband is somewhere in the vehicle." Id. at 6.); Kansas v. Potter, - Kan. App. 2d. -,
648 P.2d 1162 (1982) (search of luggage in wrecked car invalidated due to lack of probable
cause).
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with full vigor to containers found elsewhere. 140
Distinguishing between containers on the basis of whether they are in a
car at the moment probable cause to search arises destroys the efficacy
of Justice Stevens's bright-line rule. It is now necessary to "show that
the investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had
sufficient knowledge to establish probable cause but insufficient knowl-
edge to know exactly where the contraband was located." 141 The police
must now determine where the container rule142 ends and the automo-
bile exception t43 begins.' 44 It is likely that the Court will face this issue
again in the future.1
4 5
2. Eftiency Now a justifcation
The Ross majority's efficiency justification is insufficient to support
the diminution of constitutional checks upon police power. As Justice
Marshall noted in his dissent, the Court has long stressed that the infer-
ence of probable cause be approved by a "neutral and detached" magis-
140 United States v. White, No. 80-CR-159, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 9, 1982). The court
held that the evidence obtained during the search of a travel bag could not be admitted
because White had consented to let officers search his bag for money and jewels and the
officers found money and drugs. This may be an important decision in defining the scope of
probable cause in warrantless searches.
14' Ross, 655 F.2d at 1201 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
142 Under Chadwick and Sanders, the rule requires a warrant for the search of containers.
143 Under Ross, no warrant is required for a probable cause search of a car and the con-
tainers therein.
144 In Robbins v. California, the container rule and fourth amendment protections were fa-
vored over the automobile exception when containers were found during the warrantless
search of a car. In New York v. Belton, the custodial arrest and the search incident exceptions
overrode the container rule and the Court upheld the warrantless search. Now, after the
Court readjusted its priorities in Ross, the automobile exception overrides the rule from the
container cases as long as the containers are in an automobile which police have probable
cause to search. Otherwise, the container rule still prevails.
145 Since Ross was decided, the Court has handed down five per curiam judgments con-
cerning the search of items within automobiles. Four of these decisions vacate judgments of
lower courts that had invalidated searches on the basis ofRobbins v. Cafornia: United States
v. Sharpe, 606 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982) (marijuana found in
shell camper of truck after a 30 to 40 minute warrantless search); United States v. Cleary, 656
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2919 (1982) (warrantless search of unzipped
canvas bag in rear of van); United States v. Spieler, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102
S. Ct. 2919 (1982) (warrantless search of briefcase and paper bag in car trunk); Maine v.
Patton, 436 A.2d 387 (Me. 198 1),vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2919 (1982) (search of a brown paper bag
seized from back seat of automobile). The Court remanded all four cases for reconsideration
in light of Ross. The fifth case, Michigan v. Thomas, 106 Mich. App. 601, 308 N.W.2d 170
(1981), rev'dper curiam, 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982), concerned the inventory search of a car that
was to be impounded. The Court in Thomas merely reiterated the Chambers rule that "the
justification to conduct. . . a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immo-
bilized." Id. at 3081.
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trate, 46 instead of leaving the ultimate decision of whether probable
cause exists with "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime."' 47 Indeed, "the warant requirement has been a
valued part of our constitutional law for decades . . It is not an
inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police effi-
ciency."' 48 This, though, is exactly what the majority in Ross did; it
weighed fourth amendment protections against the prospect of more ef-
ficient law enforcement and found for the latter. The Court's own
precedents do not support such a finding.' 4 9
The Court should have held that the automobile exception does not
justify the warrantless search of closed opaque containers found in cars.
Whatever impracticalities may have resulted would not be severe
enough to justify the actual Ross holding.'5 0 While the standard set in
146 Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). See 102 S. Ct. 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 In Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Court stated:
The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon
executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search
and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral
officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute,
and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.
Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565
(1976); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 252 (1960).
148 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
149 The Court recently stated:
the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itselfjustify
disregard of the Fourth Amendment.. . . The investigation of crime would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view
. . . that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the
name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citations omitted). See supra note 148 and ac-
companying text.
150 Some jurisdictions now authorize magistrates to issue search warrants over the tele-
phone to requesting officers. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (c)(2)(A), added in 1977,
states, "If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit, a Federal
magistrate may issue a warrant based upon sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone
or other appropriate means." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (C)(2)(A). United States v. McEachin,
670 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 198 1), applied the rule to the warrantless search of a house. "[W]e
believe that the courts must consider the availability of a telephonic warrant in determining
whether exigent circumstances existed, unless it is clear that exigency in a particular case was
so great that it precluded recourse to any warrant procedure, however brief." Id. at 1147
(footnote omitted). In United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D. Iowa 1981), Rule
41(c)(2) was used to invalidate the warrantless search of a house, since there was sufficient
time for the officers to have telephoned for a warrant. In addition, the Supreme Court re-
cently stated in dicta that, "if a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant can
usually be obtained." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 22 (1981).
Some states have procedures for the issuance of telephonic search warrants. Both Cali-
fornia, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West, 1982) and Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3914(c), 13-3915(c)(1978 & Supp. 1981-82), have passsed statutes authorizing tel-
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Ross saves the police both time and money, and is likely to result in
more arrests, these efficiency gains come at the expense of constitutional
rights. "This case will have profound implications for the privacy of
citizens traveling in automobiles, as the Court well understands."' 5'l
In utilizing the automobile exception to justify the Ross search, the
Court applied an old rule to a novel situation to which the original justi-
fications for the fourth amendment exception cannot be applied. The
holding in Ross, particularly when combined with the search incident to
arrest doctrine, 152 significantly increases the power of officers to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles and containers found therein. Mar-
ginal gains in efficiency or clarity cannot justify such an infringement
upon constitutional rights. 15 3
III. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Ross, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
the automobile exception by holding that it justifies certain warrantless
searches of closed containers in automobiles. 154 The extension of the
doctrine to the search of containers cannot be supported by either of the
traditional justifications for the fourth amendment exception: the Court
did not find that Ross has a diminished privacy expectation in the con-
tainers, nor did it find any exigent circumstances. Justice Stevens based
his. decision upon a doctrine which, at its birth in Carroll, would have
invalidated the search in Ross due to the absence of exigency.
What is needed in this area is a return to the concept of exigent
circumstances as the sole justification for the automobile exception.' 55
Thus, a warrant would be required for the search of all containers,
ephonic warrants. In New Jersey, the procedure was validated by the courts in the absence of
a statute. See generally J. HALI, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 192-94 (1982).
The widespread adoption of the telephonic warrant procedure would weaken the ration-
ale for the Ross decision. If officers are able to radio in to a magistrate for a warrant to
conduct a car or container search, it will no longer be impractical for them to obtain warrants
prior to the search. In addition, the number of circumstances that can legitimately be labled
as exigent would be significantly reduced.
151 Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 See supra note 123.
153 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
154 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
155 Katz believes that "[t]he Court must reconsider Chambers and succeeding automobile
exception cases. . . . It should reintroduce traditional fourth amendment principles so that
the automobile exception is compatible with established search and seizure rules, permitting
waiver of the warrant requirement only when exigent circumstances or a genuine claim of
impracticality exists." Katz, supra note 76, at 572. LaFave suggests that the Court consider
the question of what constitutes 'Into' exigent circumstances" for purposes of avoiding the
warrant requirement. W. LAFAVE, supra note 77, at 543. He cites Chadwick as giving exam-
ples of what should be considered truly exigent circumstances: when an officer has probable
cause to believe that a container houses inherently dangerous items, or evidence which, in
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whether located inside or outside of cars, unless the combination of
probable cause and exigent circumstances permits otherwise. For exam-
ple, police should be able to conduct a warrantless search if they have
probable cause to believe that a package in an automobile contains a
bomb.
A police officer's probable cause belief alone, without a magistrate's
impartial review, does not justify the search of closed or locked contain-
ers in automobiles. If the Court had remained true to the traditional
justifications for the automobile exception, there would be a clear stan-
dard for the police to follow: absent exigent circumstances, a warrant
would be required to search containers found during an automobile
search. The Court's overextension of the automobile exception in Ross
gives little credence to the fact that there are, after all, two clauses in the
fourth amendment. 56
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order to be helpful, must be taken at once, or, when the search would terminate ongoing
criminal activity. Id.
Grano defines truly exigent circumstances as "present only when the police could not
have preserved the evidence by making a seizure." Under this definition of exigency, even the
search in Carroll exceeded constitutional limitations. Grano, supra note 84, at 642.
156 See supa note 72.
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